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Error in Omitting 'or Die" After a Testamentary
Gift of Income to Widow
Anthony A. Morano*
W E LAWYERS STRIVE for professional perfection in an atmosphere of
harassment. We are harried and hurried; yet, for all our meticu-
lous attention to detail and reverent rechecking, most of us have experi-
enced that overwhelming feeling of knee-buckling shame which accom-
panies the blushing realization that we have made an astoundingly trivial
but costly mistake. While agonizing memory goads us to redoubled cau-
tion in drafting all legal documents, we are especially haunted by the
fear of oversight in the preparation of wills.
We must dread not only error but also the consequent time consum-
ing and extensive research required to determine the ramifications and
effects of that error. The purpose of this essay is to consider the prob-
lems posed by a hypothetical omission of the words "or dies" from a
typical testamentary gift of income to a surviving spouse during widow-
hood. While it is sincerely hoped that no one will have need of it, the
writer wishes to record the products of his research and analysis just in
case it may assist some blushing brother's future search for the conse-
quences of that most painful of errors-the rare, unique mistake that no
one before has made.
While any variation of circumstances will vary analysis, our hypo-
thetical case is intended to provide a specific context for the general
kinds of ramifications and considerations occasioned by such an error.
In zeroing in on the issues raised by our particular case and by marshal-
ling relevant authorities, we hope to furnish not only a general guide to
assist in future cases, but also to increase the reader's appreciation of the
intricacy which even the simplest error can generate.
Suppose the following situation were to arise in Ohio. Testator dies
domiciled here survived by a wife and collateral relations. After de-
vising the homestead to wife, the will directs the executrix-wife and a
named co-executor to pay the income from the real and personal prop-
erty to wife "as long as she remains unmarried." "Should she remarry,"
the executors are directed to sell the income-producing property and to
distribute the proceeds equally among testator's collateral relations. The
will contains no express, absolute and general residuary clause as such.
Nor does it expressly provide for ultimate disposition of the income-
producing property in the event of wife's death without having remar-
ried. The only clearly expressed condition of the remainder to collaterals
is wife's remarriage.
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The executors are granted sole discretionary power of sale over said
property without court approval.
Problems Presented
The ultimate problem is to advise wife correctly concerning the
effects of election to take under or against the will. That advice depends
upon answers to the following issues:
1. Is the remarriage provision valid?
2. If wife dies without having remarried, who is entitled to the re-
mainder?
3. What is the effect of the power of sale granted to co-executors?
4. If wife elects to take against the will, what would be the effect
upon her interest in property passing to her under the will, espe-
cially the homestead?
Problem 1. Is the Remarriage Provision Valid?
The rule is elementary that conditions in general restraint of mar-
riage violate public policy and are void. The reason is obvious. Society
forbids monetary inducements unreasonably disruptive of the marital
institution. A gift on condition that the donee never marry anyone is
clearly unreasonable and void, so that the donee takes the gift free of the
condition.
The remarriage provision in the present case is unlimited as to
persons and duration, but is it a condition or a limitation? A well recog-
nized distinction with regard to limitations is admitted (with some ap-
parent distaste) by at least one Ohio authority. It is said in 56 Ohio Jur.
2d Wills,'
Although the policy of the law is as much violated by saying that
a donee shall enjoy the gift only until marriage as it is by saying
that the gift shall become forfeited upon the marriage of the donee,
and the rule as to restraints upon marriage would seem logically to
be just as much violated in the one case as in the other, and although
the doctrine that the rule against restraints does not apply where an
estate is limited until marriage has been criticized upon the ground
that whether the restraint is by limitation or condition is, in the vast
majority of cases, the effect of accident, depending on the turn of ex-
pression used, it is nevertheless so firmly established that even the
courts which have criticized it have not thought proper to decline to
follow it. The distinction is therefore universally recognized that
while a condition in absolute restraint of marriage is invalid, a lim-
itation until marriage is good; or, as it is sometimes put, marriage
may be the ground of a limitation ceasing or commencing.




An old Ohio decision has given effect to a provision which generally
restrained remarriage of a widow. The case is Luigart v. Ripley.2 There
the testator's will created a life estate for his wife with remainder to his
children upon her death or remarriage. She elected to take under the
will, remarried, and claimed dower.
The court's opinion was concerned mainly with whether she might
have dower in addition to the life estate. It held that she was not entitled
to dower because the will failed to provide specifically that the life estate
was given in addition to dower. By her election to take under the will,
she impliedly relinquished her dower interest.
The court further decided, without discussion, that wife lost her life
estate upon her remarriage. Language such as "so long as" or "until" is
generally held to be language of limitation rather than condition. In any
event, there is ample authority in accord with Luigart to the effect that
a general restraint on remarriage of a widow is valid.3
Although authority to the contrary may be found,4 recent Ohio cases
recognize the validity of such provisions, at least implicitly, and the con-
clusion is inescapable that they are valid in this state.5
Restraint on a second marriage is not so repugnant to the law's
policy when weighed against the judicial desire to effectuate a decedent's
intention to save his property for his family and to protect it against
enjoyment by a stranger-the widow's second spouse. But we must re-
turn to this problem later.
Problem 2. If Wife Dies Without Having Remarried, Who Is Entitled
to the Remainder?
Although research has disclosed no Ohio decision involving this pre-
cise problem, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Putnam v. Robertson,"
has held that where a devise was made to a widow for life, or widow-
2 18 Ohio St. 24 (1869).
3 See Am. Jur., Marriage, Section 263 and citations at 364, n. 11. A host of cases
which implicitly sustain such provisions are collected in annotated form in 22 A.L.R.
437, 454, supplemented in 68 A.L.R. 507 and 171 A.L.R. 649, all of which support the
statement in 56 Ohio Jur. 2d, Wills, Section 730 at 244:
The majority of the cases sustain the validity of a condition in restraint of the
second marriage of a widow, whether the widow is the surviving spouse of the
testator or some other decedent.
And the Restatement Trusts 2d (1959), Section 62 provides in part:
g. Restraining Marriage. A provision in the terms of the trust may be held
invalid on the ground that its enforcement would tend to restrain the marriage
of the beneficiary. Thus, a provision in the terms of the trust divesting the
interest of a beneficiary if he or she should ever marry anyone may be invalid.
Such a provision with respect to the remarriage of a widow, however, is
valid ... (Emphasis added.)
4 See, e.g., Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266, 46 Am. Rep. 598 (1883).
5 See Kuhn v. Kuhn, 111 Ohio App. 304, 168 N.E. 2d 582 (1960) and Bowman v.
Bowman, 3 Ohio Misc. 161, 210 N.E. 2d 920 (1965) and authorities cited therein.
6 140 Tenn. 456, 205 S.W. 309 (1918).
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hood, with remainder to testator's daughter, should the widow remarry,
the daughter took the remainder on the widow's death without having
remarried, even though the words "or death" were omitted from the
conditions expressed in the will.
The reasoning is this: the will expressly limits the widow's gift to
a life estate, so her death, even if unmarried, will terminate that estate
without an express provision to that effect, because it is implicit in the
nature of the estate granted. The event of her remarriage merely pro-
vides another contingency upon which her estate may terminate before
her death. The provision for remaindermen in that earlier event is not
to be read as separate and apart from the basic life estate provision.
Rather, it is to be read as part and parcel of the basic life estate pro-
vision. It is to be viewed as enlarging the rights of the remaindermen
by imposing a contingency upon which they may sooner enjoy their
estate.
This analysis is further aided by the presumption against intestacy
-that is, the presumption that a testator intends to dispose of all his
interest in property mentioned in his will, rather than have a partial
intestacy as to it.
The Putnam court contends that it merely follows a settled rule of
English law on this point and cites many English authorities. The court
further claims that earlier American authorities and writers are in
accord with the English rule, but, apparently, Putnam stands alone in
America in deciding this precise point.7
Now the question is whether Ohio courts could and should follow
Putnam in light of established principles.8 At the outset, it is noted that
Ohio clearly recognizes the presumptive rule that a testator intends to
dispose of every interest in property mentioned in his will. Ohio Revised
Code Section 2107.51 so provides as to a devise of real estate "unless it
clearly appears by the will that the testator intended to convey a less
estate." As to personalty, a judicial presumption against intestacy is
equally available.9
Can it be said that the will here clearly expresses an intention of
the testator to convey less than a complete remainder after wife's life
interest?
7 Shepard's citations indicate only one other citation of Putnam, and that by the
same Tennessee court on another point. No case other than Putnam is cited in
support of the following statement in 96 C.J.S. Wills (1957), Section 726 at p. 115:
Where an estate is given for life and with a gift over on the marriage of the
life tenant, the gift over may be effective on the death as well as the marriage
of the first taker. (Emphasis added.)
The 1967 pocket supplement indicates no change.
8 Any action to construe a will must be brought in compliance with Ohio R. C.
2107.46 and related requirements indicated in 56 Ohio Jur. 2d Wills, Section 701.




When in doubt, must an Ohio court construe this will to mean that
the collateral remaindermen were intended to take their estate in the
event of death or remarriage of wife? The presumptive rule indicates
an affirmative answer, but the problem is that such a construction would
seem to require "writing in" language in violation of the ancient maxim
that a court may not reform a will. The Statute of wills requires testator
to write his own will. The court may not do it for him.10
Having stated that basic rule, it would be futile to attempt to
analyze the myriad exceptions and confusion of principles employed by
the legions of courts which have evaded it. Many legalistic devices have
been employed, the most curious of which has been the adoption of that
imperceptibly vague distinction between latent and patent ambiguities
and the notion that extrinsic evidence may be heard to resolve latent but
not patent ambiguities, since the court may construe the will without
technically "writing in" or changing the provisions as written where the
ambiguity is latent (not apparent on the face of the will).11
In the instant case, although an ambiguity may be patent on reading
the will, it may be argued that no reformation or "writing in" is re-
quired. The language in the will which creates a life interest in income
imports the testator's intention that wife's estate is to terminate at her
death. No other language need be inserted to that effect. That the re-
maindermen are intended to take in that event, as well as upon remar-
riage, may result solely from an interpretation of the words actually used
in the will, by reading the provisions as a whole without the need for
any extrinsic evidence, so this case is not within that area.
Without greater detail then, it is enough to say that Ohio cases
recognize the anti-reformation rule, and that they have exercised wide
latitude and leniency in construing wills. Since each will is factually
peculiar, precedents are rarely of value. Indeed, rules and principles fall
to the ultimate goal which is to ascertain the testator's intention. This
broad, unhampered, liberal view is frequently enunciated and acted upon
by Ohio courts. 12
10 See 56 Ohio Jur. 2d Wills, Section 537.
11 For an example of this kind of difficulty, see Nicholl v. Bergner, 76 Ohio App. 245,
63 N.E. 2d (1945), where the will provided a gift to one Edward Bergner. There were
two Edward Bergners, a nephew and a brother of testatrix. The issue was which of
them was intended.
It was held that the ambiguity was latent so the court might hear extrinsic evi-
dence proving which Edward was intended. The court could do so without adding
to or deleting language from the will since the "Edward Bergner" contained in the
will was technically sufficient to describe either one. Fiction is obvious because on
deciding which Edward was intended the court actually would read into the will
either the words "my brother" or "my nephew."
12 See Kuhn v. Kuhn, 111 Ohio App. 304, 168 N.E. 2d 583 (1960); Merrick-Rippner,
Ohio Probate Law (2d Ed.) at 147; 56 Ohio Jur. 2d Wills, Sections 508 and 509.
For a rapid view of the see-saw of rule rigidity and leniency and of the mass of
confusion and contradiction, see 56 Ohio Jur. 2d Wills, Sections 531-563.
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The ample Ohio precedents for leniency are cited in 56 Ohio Jur.
2d. Wills, Section 570, the text of which reads as follows:
Although there are dicta in Ohio to the contrary, in the construction
of a will, words or clauses may be transposed, supplied, or omitted,
when warranted by the will. The act of supplying, transposing, or
changing words or clauses in a will, however, is a strong measure
and justified only where it is clear on the face of the will that the
testator has not accurately or completely expressed his meaning, and
where it is also clear what words have been omitted which should be
supplied. The facts of a particular case may be such that the court
will not add words or phrases. (Emphasis added)
Now the writer cannot resist blunt advocacy. The general scheme
of the instant will indicates testator's general intent that the wife was
to have only a life estate and that his blood relatives were to take the
remaining assets. The plan here is usual, ordinary, and obvious. Wife
is to have full benefit of the property during her life, or so long as she
has no second spouse to support her. Thereafter, the unexpended estate
which remains is intended for testator's own blood relations, the natural
objects of his bounty.
A reading of this will in light of common legal practice and experi-
ence tends strongly to indicate an unintentional omission of the words
"or die" following the words "should she remarry." Such words are
almost universally intended by testators, and they are almost always
.included as part and parcel of remainder provisions of this kind. Indeed
the universality of such inclusion is so vast that hours of research have
disclosed only one American case deciding the effect of their omission,
and that in Tennessee in 1918.
Obviously the writer's view is that an Ohio court could and should
construe this will to provide a remainder to collateral relations in event
of wife's death without having remarried, but the rest of our discussion
on this point assumes the possibility that an Ohio court may take the
stricter view and reach the conclusion that the will is clear and unam-
biguous, and that it simply fails to dispose of the remainder in the event
of wife's death without remarriage.13
Such a conclusion should result in a partial intestacy as to the re-
versionary interest retained by testator in the event wife dies without
marrying again. That reversionary interest should pass as intestate
property to wife as sole intestate heir of a testator who leaves no sur-
viving parents or issue. 1 4
13 There is at least dicta to the effect that an Ohio court may not supply omitted
language but may only construe what is written by testator. Nelson v. Minton, 46
Ohio App. 39, 14 Ohio Law. Abs. 679, 187 N.E. 576 (1933); Moore v. Dekebach, 46
Ohio App. 381, 188 N.E. 880 (1933).




Should wife elect to take the provisions made for her under the will,
would she thereby relinquish her rights as sole heir to all intestate
property including the aforementioned residuary interest? Such was the
holding of Jones v. Webster.15
But the Jones case was decided under a former statute 6 which pro-
vided:
If the surviving spouse elects to take under the will, such spouse
shall be thereby barred of all right to an intestate share of the estate,
and shall take under the will alone, unless it plainly appears from
the will that the provision therein for the spouse was intended to be
in addition to an intestate share. But an election to take under the
will does not bar the right to remain in the mansion of the deceased
consort, or the widow to receive one year's allowance for the sup-
port of herself and children, as provided by law, unless the will ex-
pressly otherwise directs.
The current statute17 reads:
If a surviving spouse elects to take under the will, such spouse shall
be barred of all right to an intestate share of the property passing
under the will and shall take under the will alone, unless it plainly
appears from the will that the provision therein for the spouse was
intended to be in addition to an intestate share. Such election shall
not bar the right of the surviving spouse to an intestate share of that
portion of the estate as to which the decedent dies intestate. Unless
the will expressly otherwise directs, such election shall not bar the
right of the surviving spouse to remain in the mansion of the de-
ceased consort, or to claim and receive the property or money in lieu
thereof, which is not an asset of the estate for administration as
provided by section 2115.13 of the Revised Code. Nor shall such
election bar the right of the widow to receive the allowance for the
support of herself and children provided by section 2117.20 of the
Revised Code, unless the will expressly otherwise directs. (Empha-
sis added)
Surely this statute overrules Jones. Any property not mentioned in
the will is wife's as sole intestate heir.
Such an interest in wife, together with her life estate and her power
of sale as co-executrix, taken all together, would constitute a title in her
large enough to be fairly described as a fee simple defeasible in the
event of her remarriage, but absolute upon her death without having
remarried, so that she might dispose of it by her will to the total exclu-
sion of testator's collateral blood relations, notwithstanding the provisions
of the Ohio Half and Half Statute.18
It is submitted that this conclusion would result in a full cycle re-
turn to the policy problem of restraining marriage considered supra in
15 133 Ohio St. 492, 14 N.E. 2d 928 (1938).
16 Ohio Gen. Code Section 10504-61.
17 Ohio Rev. Code Section 2107.42.
18 Ohio Rev. Code Section 2105.10 does not apply to testators.
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Problem 1. A judicial refusal to interpret this will would provide the
widow strong inducement not to marry, for in doing so, she would lose
not only her life estate but also the right to direct disposition of the fee
at her death. Yet, where such remarriage provisions were held valid in
Ohio, the widow had only a life estate to lose, and the obvious policy
sustaining validity in those cases was to save assets for the testator's
family.
But here, if widow has the reversion, she is not only offered far
greater inducement not to marry, but also this would be done without
the saving grace of thereby affording greater protection to testator's
family, since the very essence of the inducement not to marry is itself
the right of the widow at her death to divert the property from the
family.
Problem 3. What Is the Effect of the Power of Sale Granted to the
Co-Executors?
This issue is closely related to the discussion in Problem 2, supra,
for it may be contended that the grant of a life estate together with a
power of sale in the life tenant yields a grant of the fee, since the power
of sale is inconsistent with a mere life estate and therefore must have
been intended to enlarge it.
Fortunately the Ohio cases on this point appear to be dispositive of
the problem. In Bishop v. Remple,19 testator left his wife a full power
to convey. The supreme court said that it was unnecessary to label the
wife's estate a life estate or fee. It was sufficient to say that it was not
merely a life estate. The power to sell was inconsistent with a naked life
estate, but if the wife failed to sell the fee during her life, the remainder-
men were entitled to all of it. However, if she sold all or part of it, she
could defeat remaindermen's rights in the portion sold, since their rights
attached at her death to any property "that may then remain."
Subsequent explanation was made by the Ohio court in Tax Com-
mission v. Oswald.20
A power is not property, but a mere authority, and an absolute
power of disposal is not inconsistent with an estate for life only. The
gift of such power will not enlarge the estate previously given but
confers an authority in addition thereto. One may have a life estate
and yet be empowered to convey an estate in fee simple.
Combinations of life estates and powers of sale were granted by the
wills construed in Kuhn v. Kuhn2' and Bowman v. Bowman.22 Both
19 11 Ohio St. 277 (1860).
20 109 Ohio St. 36, 51, 141 N.E. 2d 678, 682 (1923).
21 111 Ohio App. 304, 168 N.E. 2d 583 (1960).




cases involved wills of life estates to surviving spouses together with
powers to sell the property. Each held that such powers of sale did not
enlarge the estate of the surviving spouse to a fee simple. The spouse
took the life estate and the power and the remaindermen retained the
right to any balance remaining at death of the life tenant.23
There is a division of authority on this point and cases contra to
Ohio may be found, but where, as in the instant case, the wife's power
of sale is limited in that she requires co-executor's consent, nearly all
courts refuse to hold that she has a fee.
2 4
But in the present case, if wife obtains co-executor's consent to sell,
what is to prevent her from selling the estate assets prior to remarriage,
thereby defeating the remaindermen who are entitled to distribution of
proceeds from the sale of "all my remaining assets, including the
building"?
Has not testator here provided a means whereby wife may defeat
the expectant estates of the remaindermen as contemplated by Ohio Re-
vised Code, section 2131.06, which reads:
When expectant estates defeated.
An expectant estate cannot be defeated or barred by any trans-
fer or other act of the owner of the intermediate or precedent estate,
nor by any destruction of such precedent estate by disseizen, for-
feiture, surrender, merger, or otherwise; but an expectant estate
may be defeated in any manner which the party creating such estate
in the creation thereof, has provided for or authorized. An expectant
estate thus liable to be defeated shall not, on that ground, be ad-
judged void in its creation.?
The will imposes no limit on the rights of co-executors to sell. In
Bishop25 the court insinuated that the right may be dependent on wife's
need for support and limited by that necessity, although no such limita-
tion was inserted in the will provision there. Here it may be implied
from the total testamentary scheme. Further, it may be argued force-
fully that the power of sale clause was inserted solely to facilitate the
performance of executors fiduciary duties of management of the assets,
their sale and resale having been contemplated by testator as a neces-
sary incident to the production of income and preservation of the fund.
Thus, as in a trust, the remaindermen have no interest in assets sold,
but they retain their interest in the proceeds of such sales, if not dis-
posed of for the life tenant's permitted purposes.2 6 Surely where the
wife's gift is of income only, she has no right to sell and consume the
corpus apart from that amount necessary for her support and comfort.
The power to sell is not a power to waste.
23 See also the Ohio authorities cited in Bowman at 165-166 of 3 Ohio Misc. and 924
of 210 N.E. 2d.
24 See Page on Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision 1961), Section 37.31.
25 Supra note 19.
26 Page on Wills, supra note 24, Section 37.37 at 670.
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Problem 4. If Wife Elects to Take Against the Will, What Would Be the
Effect Upon Her Interest in Property Passing to Her Under the Will,
Especially the Homestead?
By reason of Ohio Revised Code Section 2107.39, a surviving spouse
who elects to take against the terms of a deceased spouse's will may
take no more than one half of the net estate, and the balance of the net
estate shall pass to the deceased spouse's other heirs as if the surviving
spouse had predeceased him.
The term "net estate" as used in the statute means so much of the
testator's property as remains for distribution after payment of the
surviving spouse's statutory allowances, the decedent's debts, funeral
expenses, and the costs of administration. The allowance for a
year's support for a widow and children and one for property which
a surviving spouse may take free from administration . . . are to be
deducted before determining the share to be taken by a surviving
spouse .... 27
She takes her share by way of inheritance as though it came to her
from her deceased husband as an intestate,28 and she obtains an un-
divided interest in fee in all the real and personal property in the
estate.
29
So it appears that the effect of an election against the will here
would be to attach wife's undivided one half interest to all the assets
of the estate, including a one half interest in the fee to the homestead.
The will is not otherwise affected, and specific legacies will pass as stated
in the will "except so far as may be necessary to satisfy the spouse who
refuses to take under the will." 30
Even contingent-remainders created in the will are accelerated by
an election to take against the will.
3
'
In summary then, the effect of an election against the will would be:
1. Wife would take an undivided one half interest in all net real
and personal property, testate and intestate.
2. All specific legacies to others would be paid in full, if possible.
3. All remainders, even if contingent, would be accelerated.
4. The remaining one half interest in any intestate property would
pass to testator's other heirs as if wife had predeceased him.
32
27 56 Ohio Jur. 2d Wills, Section 842 at 358-59.
28 See Winters National Bank v. Rifle, 2 Ohio St. 2d 72, 206 N.E. 2d 212 (1965).
29 See Barlow v. Winters National Bank & Trust Co., 41 Ohio Abs. 457, 59 N.E. 2d
212 (1944).
30 See 56 Ohio Jur. 2d Wills Section 840 at 358.
31 Funkhouser v. Dorfmeier, 95 Ohio Abs., 140, 200 N. E. 2d 266 (1963).
32 On this last point, see 56 Ohio Jur. 2d Wills, Section 842, for discussion of some
conflict in the Ohio decisions.
Sept. 1968
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Conclusion
Analysis of the foregoing hypothetical yields the conclusion that its
problems suggest the simple solution that wife be advised to elect to
take against the will. Uncertainty and litigation are thereby avoided,
and at the same time, equitable distribution of testator's property is effec-
tuated. That solution may ameliorate future difficulty occasioned by
drafting oversights which any of us may make.
If the writer has accomplished nothing more, it is hoped that the
reader has been better apprised of the complexity of difficulties which
may flow from drafting oversights, however human and understandable.
Of course, the best solution is to continue close attention to detail.
The drudgery of proofreading remains the surest safeguard against error
and consequent injury to professional pride, to say nothing of client's
interests. As anyone who has done it can attest, that drudgery is negli-
gible compared to greater task of research and analysis of novel and un-
solved problems in an intricate legal field.
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